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Abstract:  Recent economic literature highlights that migrant networks help to overcome the 
informal barriers that exist in the international markets and boost international investment. 
Empirical studies on different countries confirm this prediction. This paper estimates (OLS-IV) an 
econometric model to study the impact of both emigration and immigration on Italy’s bilateral 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The main result is  that only the Italian diaspora has a significant 
positive effect on Italy’s both inward and outward FDI. A theoretical framework, a profile of the 
diaspora and of immigration in Italy and some exemplary entrepreneurial histories help to interpret 
the econometric evidence.  
 
 
Keywords: International investment, migrant networks, entrepreneurial histories 
 
JEL: F21, F23, N84 
   2
More than other European countries, Italy has an important history of mass emigration, dating from 
the mid-XIX century and, more than other nations, maintains strong links with its diaspora. They 
concern cultural and social matters, but also citizenship and political affairs. Italian emigrants and 
their offspring are Italian citizens, vote in the country’s political elections and, since 2006, have 
their own representatives in parliament. While these ties have become stronger with time, mass 
emigration has receded and finally reached an end by the beginning of the 1970s.  
The remnants of other European countries’ times of emigration of the past are essentially some 
similarities with their ex-colonies and protectorates, regarding legal systems, norms, language. 
Perhaps because of the labour rather than imperial nature of its emigration, Italy has maintained 
links that relate directly with the people of the diaspora, rather than with the foreign countries of 
destination. 
In more recent times, the rich European economies have become receiving countries, and many 
international links are now built by the immigrant populations. Fullilove depicts the transnational 
networks of migrants as world wide webs, which are ‘the human face of globalization’.
1 The 
economic literature has focused on the impact of networks on trade and investments between the 
immigrants’ countries of origin and of destination. Its base hypothesis is that transnational networks 
boost international trade and investments because they help to overcome the barriers – due to 
differences in cultures, institutions and languages – that separate countries in world markets.
2  
Like the other rich European economies, Italy is now a receiving country. Since the beginning of 
the 1970s, immigration inflows have been growing rapidly, and immigrants now count for at least 
5% of the total population. Immigrants, therefore, can be expected to influence Italy’s exchanges 
with their countries of origin, as they do in other economies. However, Italy has also maintained 
strong ties with its diaspora, and these may also affect its bilateral exchanges. Hence, Italy stays at 
the centre of two potential sets of networks and, as such, represent a case of particular interest: both 
emigrants and immigrants could influence international transactions. Moreover, the distribution of 
their countries of destination and origin mostly do not overlap geographically, and, as a 
consequence, if significant, their influences should add up.   
This paper adds to this body of literature by focusing on the impact of both immigration and 
emigration on Italy’s bilateral foreign direct investments (FDI), and tries to understand whether and 
why one or the other set of networks may prevail. The paper is structured as follows.  
                                                 
1 Fullilove (2008), ‘World Wide Webs’, p. vii. 
2 Among empirical studies that document a positive impact of immigrants on bilateral trade and investment are, on the 
UK: Girma and Yu, ‘The Link Between Immigration and Trade’; on France: Combes et al., ‘The Trade-Creating 
Effects’; on Germany: Buch et al., ‘Where Enterprises Lead’; on Spain: Blanes, ‘Immigrant’s Characteristics’; on the 
US: Gould, ‘Immigrant Links’; Head and Ries, ‘Immigration and Trade Creation’; Dunlevy, ‘The Impact of 
Corruption’; Kugler and Rapoport, ‘International Labor’.   3
Section 1 outlines the theoretical framework. It is based on the explanation of the role of diaspora in 
prompting business between countries provided by matching and network models
3 and on the strand 
of literature on social networks that analyses the interactions among individuals, within and 
between networks, in terms of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties.
4 
Section 2 tests the relationship between migrant networks and the Italian FDI by estimating an 
econometric model (OLS-IV). It takes into account the stocks of Italian emigrants abroad and 
immigrants in Italy in the 1990-2004 period, as well as a number of other proxies for socio-cultural 
and institutional similarities between countries (i.e distance, quality of governance, regional 
agreements, religion) that can influence investment decisions by firms. The main result is  that only 
the Italian diaspora has a significant positive effect on Italy’s both inward and outward FDI. 
Section 3 presents a historical profile of Italian diaspora and of immigration in Italy that helps to 
interpret the results of the econometric analysis. In particular, it focuses on the direct ties between 
the communities of migrants and their countries of origin. By considering the social, cultural, 
institutional and economic dimensions of these ties, it shows that the strong ties that have developed 
between the Italian diaspora and the home country have, on the one hand, prompted FDI from and 
to those countries where there is a sizeable Italian community, but, on the other hand, may have led 
to the rejection of other interactions that would qualify as weak ties, as those with the networks of 
immigrants in Italy. 
Sections 4 and 5 present some exemplary entrepreneurial histories of outward and inward Italian 
FDI for which emigrants’ strong ties played a relevant role. As regards outward FDI, these ties have 
provided information, financing, managerial skills, labour force, distribution channels and demand 
provided to Italian firms desiring to invest abroad, while inward FDI have crucially relied on the 
information element. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix provides details on data and sources.  
 
2. Theoretical frameworkI 
Recent studies in economics show that differences between countries in culture, institutions and 
social norms are informal barriers that obstruct trade and international investments and that the 
international migration of people, in particular the ethnic and business transnational links that 
migrants and diaspora build across countries, tend to lower these barriers.
5   
                                                 
3 Rauch, ‘Business and Social Networks’; Casella and Rauch, ‘Anonymous Market’; Rauch and Casella, ‘Overcoming 
Informational Barriers’. 
4 Granovetter, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’; Greif, ‘Institutions and International Trade’. 
5 Rauch, ‘Business and Social Networks’; Gould, ‘Immigrant Links’.   4
Some theoretical explanations for the economic role of diaspora are provided by matching and 
migration models.
6 Rauch and Casella develop a model of matching in the international markets 
where entrepreneurs search for partners of other countries with the aim of producing jointly. 
Immigrants supply entrepreneurs with information and provide matching and referral services on 
business opportunities in their home countries. The probability of successful matching is higher for 
entrepreneurs endowed with the information and the ties provided by immigrants.
7 Several 
empirical studies have found a positive and significant impact of migrant networks on bilateral trade 
and investment between their destination and home countries.
8  
Any group of migrants is supposed to exert a positive impact on a country’s external transactions, 
independently of their ethnicity. These models, however, do not contemplate another possibility, 
which is that, because of a lack of trust, entrepreneurs may reject the information and referral 
services provided by some groups of immigrants. Trust on the information provided by 
heterogeneous agents may depend on the ethic or cultural vicinity between these agents and the 
potential users. As a simplifying example, consider a country where entrepreneurs can choose 
between the ties provided by two types of individuals, immigrants, who belong to other ethnic 
groups, and emigrants, who are of their same ethnicity. All agents, immigrants and emigrants, 
supply ties that objectively lead to the same returns and each of them relate to different foreign 
partners or countries (there is no overlapping). If the entrepreneurs rely more on the information 
provided by individuals of their same ethnicity (emigrants), and if this is so to the point that some or 
all of the ties supplied by the other agents (immigrants) are rejected, then the country’s number of 
successful matching and overall returns in the international markets decreases together with the 
level of inter-ethnic trust.
9 At the two opposite extremes, for very low  trust levels, only the 
emigrants’ ties will be utilized, for high and not-binding levels all the ties supplied will be used.
10 
                                                 
6 Casella and Rauch, ‘Anonymous Market’; Rauch and Casella, ‘Overcoming Informational Barriers’; Rauch and 
Trindade, ‘Ethnic Chinese Networks’; Kugler and Rapoport, ‘International Labor’. 
7 Rauch and Casella, ‘Overcoming Informational Barriers’. 
8 Relatively to trade: Gould, ‘Immigrant Links’; Head and Ries, ‘Immigration and Trade Creation’; Girma and Yu, ‘The 
Link between Immigration and Trade’; Wagner et al., ‘Immigration and the Trade of Provinces’; relatively to FDI: Gao, 
‘Ethnic Chinese Networks’; Tong, S. J. ‘Ethnic Networks’; Buch et al., ‘Where Enterprises Lead’; Kugler and 
Rapoport, ‘International Labor’; Docquier and Lodigiani, ‘Skilled Migration’. 
9 This example assumes that matching and production abroad concerns only the native entrepreneurs of each country 
and not migrants themselves.   
10 In the spatial model of Casella and Rauch individuals may reject the ties that lead to returns that are certain but lower 
than the uncertain returns of untied matching (Casella and Rauch, ‘Anonymous Market’). Differently, in our case some 
ties are rejected because the individuals providing the ties are not trusted by the entrepreneurs, even when the effective 
returns are the same for both the accepted and the rejected ties. The lack of trust depends on the ethnic characteristics of 
the individuals, not on their ‘spatial’ positions in the matching model. Goldberg et al. present a principal-agent model of 
investments abroad where principals-investors are subject to moral hazard by the agents linked to the investments 
abroad. In our assumptions, investors consider the risk of moral hazard to be higher with immigrants than with 
emigrants, despite the effective risk is the same. The attitude is similar to that related to discrimination in the labor 
market (Goldberg et al., ‘Foreign Direct Investment’). A different strand of the literature takes into account the   5
Cohesiveness within social groups and relations between groups are analyzed by a strand of social 
networks theory. Granovetter analyses the interactions taking place among individuals belonging to 
a group or society and defines them in terms of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties.
11 Ties are strong when 
everybody within the group knows each other, while ties are weak when each individual may know 
each other’s relevant characteristics either directly or by referral. The contours of weak-ties 
networks are less sharply defined, and members of the network interact with individuals of other 
groups more often than in the strong-ties case. Ties crucially affect the economic performance of 
groups or societies. As innovation and information flow more rapidly when running through both 
direct and indirect channels, the more vibrant economies are those characterized by the 
predominance of weak ties. In Granovetter’s view, this determines “the strength of weak ties”. 
Closed coalitions, in contrast, impose a limit to the spread of information and to profitable 
economic interactions. 
Greif analyses the social, cultural and institutional factors through which transnational networks 
affected trade and investment in history.
12 Similarly to Granovetter, he maintains that members of 
diasporas with strong ties, such as the Maghribis during the Middle Ages, exerted a positive impact 
on the economic transactions between the countries where they resided, but also that they rejected 
other potentially more profitable and efficient interactions with networks and countries that were 
external to their coalition. 
We\have seen that recent empirical literature on transnational networks focused on the impact of 
immigrants on the bilateral economic interactions between several countries. Italy is a case of 
particular interest in this respect because it allows the study of the impact of both immigrant and 
emigrant networks. In fact, Italy has experienced massive flows of people in both directions: 
outward, since the mid nineteenth century until the 1970s, and inward, with rapidly growing 
immigration, since the 1970s. According to the basic insights of networks theory, Italy should stand 
at the center of a double set of world wide webs, one generated by the Italian diaspora and the other 
by the immigrants, and both should positively affect bilateral FDI.  
The networks of emigrants and immigrants, however, differ in an essential aspect: while the former 
are of the same ethnicity as Italian natives, and the latter are composed by an heterogeneous 
collection of diverse ethnicities. According to the theories of ties and coalitions of Granovetter and 
Greif, these two sets of networks could affect Italian FDI in a different way if, for example, Italian 
entrepreneurs tended to prefer the ties supplied by individuals of their own ethnicity.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
characteristics of migrants by distinguishing between skilled and unskilled individuals (Kugler and Rapoport, 
‘International Labor’; Docquier and Lodigiani, ‘Skilled Migration’). 
11 Granovetter, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’. 
12 Greif, ‘Institutions and International Trade’.   6
More precisely, an econometric testing showing a positive impact of both immigrants and emigrants 
on Italy’s FDI would suggest that Italian entrepreneurs utilize in the same way, and trust equally, 
the ties provided by individuals of their same ethnicity and by immigrants and, also, that the 
immigrants themselves make use of their ties with the home countries. In this case, the ‘Italian 
network’, including the diaspora and entrepreneurs in Italy, would qualify as of a weak-ties type. 
Conversely, if only members of the diaspora significantly affected FDI, the ‘Italian network’ could 
be seen as a strong-ties coalition, which does not interact with the immigrant networks while, at the 
same time, the latter do not develop their own transnational links. Finally, if only immigrants 
affected FDI, then it could be presumed that entrepreneurs privilege the weaker, but newer, ties 
provided by these networks.
13 
 
2. Econometric analysis 
 
In this section we test the relationship between migrant networks and Italian FDI by estimating an 
econometric model (OLS-IV) that takes into account the stocks of Italian emigrants abroad and of 
immigrants in Italy, assuming that in principle any of these networks may provide matching and 
referral services to investors. Moreover, together with distance, which is meant to capture 
transaction and other costs that increase with the geographic distance between countries, we also 
consider some proxies for the socio-cultural and institutional similarities between countries, as 
quality of governance, regional agreements and religion. These similarities, which may have been 
inherited from colonial times, tend to lower the informal barriers that impede international 
investments. 
We consider the FDI position of 51 foreign countries with respect to Italy (inward FDI) and also the 
FDI position of Italy in these economies (outward FDI), for which Oecd and Unctad statistics are 
available.
14 We take into account the average FDI stocks for each country over the period from 
1990 to 2004. Details on data and sources of our dataset are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
Following Goldberg et al.
15 we choose a specification of the econometric model which focuses on 
the ‘human’ factors determining FDI. We are not attempting to explain the level of FDI from one 
                                                 
13 In the case of both immigrants and emigrants positively affecting FDI, it could be also be hypothesised that each set 
of networks works independently and as a closed coalition: Italian entrepreneurs with emigrants, and immigrant 
networks on their own. While this cannot be excluded in theory, in practice it is difficult to conceive immigrants as  
isolated communities within the host economy that invest abroad and receive investments from abroad. 
14 Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria*, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, S. Korea, Croatia, 
Denmark*, Egypt, France*, Germany*, Japan, Greece*, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland*, Israel, Libya, 
Luxembourg*, Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Netherlands*, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, UK*, Czech Rep., 
South Africa, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain*, USA, Sweden*, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela. *: EU-15. 
15 Goldberg et al., ‘Foreign Direct Investment’.   7
country to another, which depends upon many factors, both for the source country and the 
destination country.
16 More precisely, we focus on the impact of the human factors on the 
‘abnormal’ stocks of bilateral FDI, i.e. on those stocks that exceed or fall short of a country’s 
propensity to invest globally. For example, we measure France’s share of FDI into Italy relatively to 
the sum of all 51 countries’ FDI in Italy (which is France’s propensity to invest in Italy) and the 
share of France’s FDI in the world relatively to the sum of all 51 countries’ FDI in the world 
(France’s propensity to invest globally). Then we say that France invests an ‘abnormal’ amount in 
Italy if the proportion of Italy’s inward FDI originating from France is larger than the share of 
France’s FDI in the world. Symmetrically, we take into account also Italy’s abnormal investments 
abroad, by considering the part of Italian FDI in each partner country that exceeds of falls short of 
Italy’s propensity to invest globally. Since we are now dealing with FDI from only one country, we 
do not need to normalize by the total size of a country’s FDI as we did when considering inward 
FDI.  
 
2.1. The econometric specifications 
To determine the effect of information on the amount of FDI coming from a particular country and 
avoid the effect of scale – large countries invest more and receive more FDI – we employ a two-
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,  is a scale factor (world 
normalization) that measures the share of country i’ FDI worldwide relative to the sum of all 51 
countries’ FDI in the word. This normalization takes into account the fact that large countries invest 
more and receive more FDI. We can interpret the residual term i ξ  as the ‘abnormal’ amount of FDI 
by country i in Italy relative to what we would expect given the importance of country i in the total 
FDI of the world. Countries with relatively large FDI in Italy vis-à-vis their worldwide FDI will 
have a positive residual.  
                                                 
16 Among them, the size of the economies (e.g. GDP or population) and their wealth (e.g. per capita GDP), labour and 
capital costs, health and safety regulations, the availability of local knowledge pools or natural resources, the necessity 
of avoiding import duties. On the determinants of the level of Italian inward and outward FDI, see Murat and Pistoresi, 
‘Emigrants and Immigrants Networks’.    8
The residuals obtained from Eq. (1) are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. We can note that 18 
countries out of 51 show positive abnormal inward FDI. Those showing the highest values 
(Switzerland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, UK and Germany) have been amongst the main 
destinations of the Italian diasporas and nowadays host a sizeable Italian community. 
Our objective is to explain this ‘abnormal’ FDI in terms of the relative quality of information on 
investment opportunities in Italy available to investors from country i. On that purpose, we estimate 
the following equation:  
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EMI is the share of the Italian emigrants in country i relative to the total of Italians in 
the 51 countries of our sample; 
∑ IT , j
IT , i
IMMI
IMMI is the share of immigrants from country i relative to the 
total immigrants in Italy from the 51 economies considered.
17 EMI and IMMI are respectively the 
stock of emigrants from Italy to country i and the stock of immigrants in Italy from country i. DIST 
is the distance between country i’s capital city and Rome (km), which captures the role of proximity 
in affecting investment decisions and other investment costs that increase with distance. GOV is an 
index of the quality of institutions and governance, which we have derived from Kaufmann et al.:
18 
this index’s values are a positive function of civil liberties, political rights, independence of the 
media, political stability, quality of bureaucracy, supply of public services, effectiveness and 
predictability of judiciary institutions and enforceability of contracts, and a negative function of 
regulatory burdens on foreign trade and business development and corruption.  
As a proxy of ‘culture’, we include a variable on religion: CH is the share of people of Christian 
religion, including the Orthodox, in the overall population. A common market and institutional 
similarity role is captured by the dummy EU, that equals to 1 if a country is a member of the 
European Union in the 1995 (EU-15) and equals to 0 if not. This variable captures Italy’s different 
propensities to invest (or receive investment) into (or from) the EU.
19 
                                                 
17 In another work we also present regressions where the network effect is proxied by the stocks of migrants in logs. 
The inclusion of the stocks instead of the shares of migrants does not alter the outcome of the econometric exercise. See 
Murat, Pistoresi and Rinaldi, ‘Migrant Networks’.  
18 Kaufmann et al., ‘Governance Matters’. 
19 Actually, this two-step regression procedure is not necessary, and we use it only to exhibit in the Appendix the 
residuals from the first stage to show which countries have positive or negative ‘abnormal’ FDI. All results we obtain 
from such a two-step procedure are very similar if we do one regression with the same dependent variable, but include 
our other explanatory variables on the right-hand of Eq. (1), as in the following one-step regression:   9
We also model Italy’s outward FDI and the variables which should help Italian investors to have 
access to information and judge the quality of investment opportunities abroad. Since we are now 
dealing with FDI from only one country, we do not need to normalize by the total size of a 
country’s FDI as we did when considering inward FDI.
20 Hence, for Italy’s outward FDI we simply 
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where the control variables are the same as for Eq. (2). Table A3 in the Appendix shows that Italy’s 
outward FDI have ‘abnormal’ values in 11 countries out of 51. Most of them (Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, United States, France, UK, Germany, Brazil and Argentina) host large Italian 
communities.  
The expected signs of the regressors are the same for both Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), that is, for both 
inward and outward abnormal FDI. We expect, except for distance, positive coefficients for all the 
control variables: they should increase the FDI (dependent variable) via a reduction of the 
information and other transaction costs related to investments abroad.
21  
 
2.2. OLS results 
In Tables 1 and 2 we present the results from the OLS estimation respectively of Eq. (2) for Italy’s 
inward FDI and Eq. (3) for outward FDI. The estimates in columns 1 are from a general model 
where all the potential determinants of FDI are included, while in columns 2 we present a final 
parsimonious specification. F-tests of the model reduction strategy are presented in both Tables.
22 
Table 1 shows that all the statistically significant variables (distance, world normalisation and 
emigrant networks) for inward FDI have the expected signs. A significant pro-inward FDI effect of 
Italian emigrants is always present. Conversely, a significant negative sign of immigrants in Italy 
appears an all the models. The quality of institutions (GOV), cultural and religion similarity (CH), 
and the proximity and historical common market area (EU dummy) do not play a significant role in 
explaining the propensity to invest in Italy. 
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Estimates from this one-step regression are presented in Murat, Pistoresi and Rinaldi, ‘Migrant Networks’. 
20 Here we are considering a country’s FDI (Italy’s outward FDI) and not a variety of countries with different total FDI. 
In other words, the scale factor (e.g., the world normalization) is always the same across the cross-sectional units.  
21 We have also controlled for the GDP and per-capita GDP. Both variables are not statistically significant in 
determining Italy’s ‘abnormal’ inward and outward FDI. Results are available on request. 
22 We do not report the intermediate steps of the reduction from ‘general to specific’ model. Also note that a ‘specific to 
general’ strategy produces the same results. Results are available on request.   10
Table 2 also reveals a significant pro-outward FDI effect of Italian emigrants. This is present in all 
the regressions, while immigrants in Italy are not statistically significant. Among the other 
independent variables, only the EU dummy is significant in explaining Italy’s ‘abnormal’ outward 
FDI. It shows that Italy’s propensity to invest within the EU is significantly greater than its 
propensity to invest in other areas. 
These results confirm the findings of a previous paper, focused on trade rather than FDI: while 
emigrants exert a positive significant influence on Italy’s bilateral trade flows, immigrant networks 
are not a significant determinant.
23  
To conclude, in terms of the theoretical framework of Section I, these results suggest that the 
interactions between Italy and its diaspora are privileged with respect to those with immigrants in 
Italy. The ‘Italian network’, which includes the diaspora and the entrepreneurs at home, seems to be 
working as a strong-ties coalition. Furthermore, the negative coefficient of the immigrants variable 
shows that the immigrants’ sending countries invest below normal in Italy. Hence, not only the 
immigrants business links appear to be weaker or inactive, but, as in the traditional model of 




                                                 
23 Murat and Pistoresi, ‘Migrant Networks’. 
24 Burda, ‘Factor Mobility’. Moreover, Kugler and Rapoport show that the expansion of the unskilled labour force in the 
economy has ambiguous effects on the returns to capital: on the one hand they increase because of the increased labour 
supply, on the other hand, they decrease because the share of human capital (of skilled labour force) in the economy 
diminishes (Kugler and Rapoport, ‘International Labor’). We do not control for skilled and unskilled immigration but, 
as we show in Section III, a great majority of the immigrant labour force in Italy is employed in low-skilled jobs.   11
 
Table 1 Determinants of the “abnormal” FDI by other countries into the Italian economy (inward FDI) – Eq. 
(2): cross-section regressions  











European Union dummy : EU  
 
-0.00014 (-0.009)   
Distance (logs) : DIST 
 
-0.0112 ***(-3.12)  -0.011***(-3.18) 
Governance quality index (standardised): GOV 
 
0.0180 (0.754)   
Christian share: CH 
 



















,   -0.189** (-2.061) 

















F –statistic testing coefficients equal to zero 
  
F(4,44) = 0.35, p-value = 0.83 
 
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level. The t-value in parenthesis is based on the White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors. For some coefficients are also reported in parenthesis t-values  (HC1 and HC2) based on different heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors. HC1 is provided by MacKinnon and White (1985) and HC2 by Davidson and Mackinnon (2004).    12
Table 2. Determinants of the FDI from Italy into other countries (outward FDI) – Eq. (3): cross-section 
regressions 
 








0.0020  (0.10) 
 
0.0036  (1.32) 
European Union dummy : EU  
 
0.0307*  (1.99)  0.0406**  (2.85) 
Distance (logs) : DIST 
 
-0.0017  (-0.84)   
Governance quality index (standardised): GOV  
 
0.2259  (1.39)   
Christian share: CH 
 
0.0059  (0.96)   






EMI   0.3012**  (2.57) 
(HC1: 2.39; HC2: 2.18) 
0.3365** (2.85) 







,   -0.0117  (-1.24) 
(HC1: -0.23; HC2:-0.18 ) 
-0.0114  (-0.31) 

















F –statistic testing coefficients equal to zero 
  
F(3,43) = 1.23, p-value  = 0.30 
 
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level. The t-value in parenthesis is based on the White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors. For some coefficients are also reported in parenthesis t-values  (HC1 and HC2) based on different heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors. HC1 is provided by MacKinnon and White (1985) and HC2 by Davidson and Mackinnon (2004).    13
2.3.  Instrumental Variable Results 
This sub-section addresses the potential simultaneous causality bias due to FDI affecting migration 
and migration affecting FDI. For example, migrant networks may reduce transaction costs by 
conveying information on investment opportunities or providing contacts to facilitate FDI inflows 
to the migrants’ origin country. In this case the causality runs from migrant networks to FDI.
25 
However, as FDI inflows capital, know how, new technologies, they may lead to faster economic 
growth, better employment opportunities and higher wages. This can have a positive effect on 
migrant flows. In this case, the causality runs from FDI to migration flows.  
This simultaneous bias may occur for both inward and outward FDI and the shares of emigrants and 
immigrants. For this reason we also estimate the econometric models for both inward and outward 
FDI by using the Instrumental Variables Method (IV). The IV estimation permits to obtain 
consistent regression coefficients by using instruments (in the IV terminology the ‘exogenous’ 
variables) instead of the regressors X, i.e. the migration variables (in the IV terminology the 
‘endogenous’ variables)
26. These instruments must be correlated to the X, but not correlated (or 
scarcely correlated) with the dependent variable Y, i.e. the FDI.  
The instruments we used for the emigrant network variables are: i) the predetermined stock of 
Italian emigrants in 1990, ii) the number of Italian schools abroad in 1990. Instruments for the 
immigrant networks are: a) the predetermined stock of immigrants in Italy in 1990, b) the 
population density in the origin country, c) the immigrant populations in the core European 
economies in 1990.  
We remand to Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix for a detailed description of the instruments, the 
endogenous variables and their combined use in the estimation. In those Tables we also report the 
Hausman test to discriminate between OLS and IV, the first stage F statistics on the instrument 
relevance and finally the Sargan over identifying test on the validity of the instruments.
27 All tests 
for instrument relevance suggest that the predetermined stock of foreign immigrants in Italy 1990 
and the population density in the origin country in 1990 are weak instruments. For this reason we 
do not report in the tables the outcome for these IV estimations. Note that in all cases, the Hausman 
test suggests that the OLS regressions is preferred. To conclude, the IV analysis reinforces the 




                                                 
25 Buch et al., ‘Where Enterprises Lead’; Goldberg et al., ‘Foreign Direct Investment’; Javorcik et al., ‘Migrant 
Networks’. 
26 On the simultaneous causality bias in OLS, see Stock and Watson, Introduction to Econometrics. 
27 Ibid.    14
 
 
3. A profile of Italian emigration and of immigration in Italy  
 
In this Section we try to explain the results of the econometric analysis carried out in Section II by 
considering in an historical perspective the main factors affecting the strength ties of the networks 
generated by Italian emigration abroad and foreign immigration in Italy. These are: i) effective 
contacts between migrants and their countries of origin, including return and circular migration, 
travel between host and origin countries; ii) cultural and economic ties, prompted by migrant 
associations of various kinds, schools in the origin country language, flows of remittances,  home 
and host countries’ subsidies to immigrant associations; iii) institutional links, such as bilateral 
agreements between host and home countries on migration, laws of citizenship.  
 
3.1. Italian emigration 
Emigration from Italy reached massive proportions between 1860 and 1970. It is estimated that 
about 25 million Italians – that is, one out of four – emigrated in that period.
28 Nowadays the 
number of people of Italian nationality or descent living abroad may approach that of the population 
in Italy (about 60 million).
29 The main destinations of emigrants were Western Europe, North and 
South America and Australia. Departures were dictated mainly by labor reasons and a high 
proportion of emigrants returned.
30 Not only they made their way back home more frequently than 
other European emigrants, but they returned also from the more distant destinations of America and 
Australia. Argentina, for example, was a land of permanent settlement, but also of annual (circular) 
migrations related to the harvesting seasons, which are reversed with respect to the northern 
hemisphere.
31 Italians abroad tended to gather in ethnic communities, little Italys in the cities and 
rural villages into the countryside, and to remain deeply tied to the home country.
32 Associations 
were widespread. In earlier times these consisted especially of mutual aid societies, workers’ aid 
societies called patronati, social circles, but also business associations and Chambers of 
Commerce.
33 Remittances, since the earlier times have been conspicuous. 
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Except for the fascist era, when permanent departures were banned or restricted, the Italian 
government demonstrated interest in the emigration phenomenon and even actively regulated and 
backed it. It subsidized travel expenses, made agreements with the governments of destination 
countries aimed at guaranteeing acceptable living and working standards for the emigrants, ensured 
repatriation in difficult circumstances, banned emigration to certain countries during pestilences, 
subsidized the creation of schools of Italian language and culture abroad, of Italian hospitals, and 
supported the existence of patronati.
34  
Emigration for the Italian government meant lower demographic pressure within the country, 
especially amongst the poorest, inflows of hard currency and higher purchasing power through 
remittances, but also favorable effects on some sectors of the economy (for example, sea-
transports). In fact, Italian communities abroad did more than that: they  imported Italian goods in 
their host countries, and were also crucial for the foreign investments of Italian firms. They supplied 
information to potential exporters and investors on existing business opportunities, made available 
the financial means needed to accomplish the investments, provided managerial skills, were a 
reliable labor force and represented a final demand for the goods produced. However, only during 
short periods of time, the Italian government considered the influence of the diaspora on the 
internationalization of the Italian economy. At the end of the nineteenth century it subsidized the 
creation of Italian Chambers of Commerce abroad; but stopped by the early 1920s, with the onset of 
the fascist regime. After WWII the government reconsidered the matter of emigration and, with it, 
the role of the diaspora, but again, it was seen more as a factor that lowered demographic pressure 
at home and sustained Italy’s balance of payments through remittances rather than one that boosted 
business and bilateral FDI.
35 
A particularly important issue for emigrants was citizenship. A wish to ensure the possibility of 
repatriation, after decades of absence and even for the progeny, was deeply felt. In 1908 and 1911, 
the first two general meetings of the Congress of Italians Living Abroad focused on this issue.
36 In 
1912 the Italian government, acting in response to the requests of emigrants, extended the right of 
citizenship to their offspring. The law, based on the principle of the jus sanguinis (adopted also in 
the new 1992 citizenship law), acknowledges the right to citizenship to the Italian progeny born 
abroad, even beyond the first and second generation. Being also compatible with dual and multiple 
citizenship, it allows also emigrants to become naturalized citizens in the host countries without 
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ceasing to be Italians. There are very few examples of countries’ laws of citizenship as favorable to 
their diasporas as the Italian one.
37  
Despite emigration rates dropped dramatically in the 1970s, when the Italian economy reached high 
levels of living, the ties between the diaspora and the home country did not fade but, in some 
respects, became even stronger. In 1988 the Italian government provided registered emigrants the 
right to vote in Italy’s parliamentary elections; subsequently, it allowed the possibility of voting by 
post and, since the last political elections in 2006, also of having their own representatives in 
parliament. 
While the social, political and institutional ties between the diaspora and the home country have 
always been tight and their strength has increased along time, their full economic implications have 
been rarely recognized or become object of active policies. More generally, and independently from 
emigration, throughout the twentieth century the attitude of the Italian authorities with respect to 
FDI, both outward and inward, has been extremely cautious. This may explain their scarce interest 
on the economic support that the diaspora could offer to the Italian FDI. However, paradoxically, 
the government’s scarce interest may have contributed to increase the effective importance of 
emigrants in prompting Italian FDI. Without the government’s active support and without 
significant colonial markets depending on their country, Italian entrepreneurs had to rely heavily on 
the emigrant communities abroad.  
 
3.2. Immigration in Italy 
Immigration in Italy is a relatively recent phenomenon. Since immigration rates became positive, at 
the beginning of the 1970s, people arrivals increased rapidly. Immigrants originate  from a wide 
number of foreign countries, most of them developing. Some ethnic groups are overrepresented, 
especially from East European, North African and East Asian countries, but people from several 
other areas, of Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America, are also present.  
Except for the minority of people originating from other European and rich countries, most 
immigrants in Italy do not visit their countries of origin frequently, mostly because traveling abroad 
has been restricted by a heavy burden of regulations on immigration and residence permits. 
However, immigrants send annually home huge amounts of remittances.
38  
While the Italian law of citizenship, based on the jus sanguini, has proven to be extremely inclusive 
for the members of the Italian diaspora, it has also revealed to be strongly exclusive for immigrants. 
Regular immigrants and their children born in Italy can be entitled to become Italian citizens only if 
they fulfill restrictive conditions and go through long and cumbersome procedures. The result of 
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this is that only a tiny share of immigrants have succeeded in becoming Italian citizens (about 0.6% 
of the immigrant population in 2004). At the same time, some immigrants’ home countries do not 
allow their nationals to hold dual or multiple citizenships (i.e., China, Philippines, Egypt, Ukraine, 
India). This, in turn, contributes to lessen their willingness to apply for the Italian citizenship.   
Also the propensity to form associations appears to be weaker among immigrants in Italy than for 
Italians abroad. However, these two phenomena are not strictly comparable. One reason is that a 
diaspora refers to a common nationality in different locations, while immigration concerns an 
heterogeneity of nationalities in a common location. Thus, the former reveals the ‘cultural’ 
tendency of a population to form associations abroad while the latter rather reflects the stimulus that 
a country provides to immigrants to form associations. Another reason is that several Italian 
associations abroad were formed before WWII, when proper welfare states did not still exist in 
many of the host countries and were replaced by mutual aid societies. These are extremely rare 
among modern immigrant populations in developed countries, where aid, especially in terms of 
health, social security and schooling, is typically provided by government institutions. Nonetheless, 
the propensity to form associations among immigrants in Italy seems particularly weak, especially 
in comparison with that of immigrants in other rich countries.
39    
Together with the hypothesized crowding out effect exerted by Italian institutions and groups, other 
factors may have contributed to determine this result. One is shortest history of the immigration 
phenomenon in Italy relatively to other European destination countries. Time, however, turns out to 
be to be a secondary factor in influencing the formation of associations when the economic status 
and the social mobility of immigrants are taken into account. Immigrant associations tend to 
mushroom and thrive as the members of the immigrant communities are successful and reach higher 
levels of education and wealth in the host countries.
40 Recent studies have shown that, more than in 
other rich countries, immigrants in Italy tend to be employed in the low-skill, low-pay segments of 
the labor market, and that this happens independently of their education levels.
41  
It has been also observed that, in general, the associative activity is weaker among gender-
unbalanced immigration populations. A substantial proportion of immigrants in Italy, originating 
from East European and from some Asian and Latin American countries, is composed by women, 
most of whom are employed in low-skilled jobs in the tertiary sector, such as house-keeping and 
elderly-caring. Their levels of education are in many cases above the average of the overall 
immigrant population, but the gender imbalance together with the character of jobs tend to curb the 
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formation of associations, especially of the kind that may be conducive to economic international 
links and bilateral investments.
42 
Hence, the more recent phenomenon of immigration in Italy relatively to other rich countries, 
together with the prevalence of low-paid jobs among immigrants, their scarce social and economic 
mobility, the weak presence of immigrants associations, are all consistent with a lack of influence 
of immigrant networks on Italy’s bilateral FDI, and help to explain the results of the econometric 
exercise in Section II. They suggest that Italy’s strong ties with its diaspora may have in fact 
crowed-out the weaker, but potentially profitable, ties with immigrant networks and, through them,  
with their countries of origin. This seems to be a serious problem as some of these networks are 
generated by immigrants from emerging fast-growing countries (i.e., China). 
 
 
4. Entrepreneurial histories: Outward FDI 
 
The Italian government’s neglect of the business dimension of international ties turned out to 
strengthen the role of Italian communities abroad in prompting both outward and inward FDI. In 
this section we present some exemplary entrepreneurial histories of outward FDI by Italian firms in 
the twentieth century to show how these have been influenced by the strong-ties type interactions 
between Italian diaspora and their homeland. The circumstance that the entrepreneurial histories we 
select in this section cover a much longer span than the 1990-2004 period of the dataset we used in 
the econometric analysis is justified by the fact that, as we have seen, the latter considers FDI stock 
data that by their very nature are the outcome of a cumulative and long-standing process dating 
back well before 1990. The overall picture that emerges from such entrepreneurial histories is that 
emigrants’ networks provided Italian firms investing abroad with: i) the demand for the final 
products of their foreign subsidiaries; ii) the capital needed to finance the investment abroad; iii) a 
reliable ethnic labour force and managerial staff; iv) information on business opportunities in their 
countries of settlement. The first three channels have been important above all in the initial phases 
of internationalisation but their relevance seems to have faded after the 1970s. Conversely, the role 
of information channelled by emigrants appears to have become paramount over time. 
 
4.1. The demand for final products 
The possibility of relying on an ethnic demand by Italian emigrants for products they perceived as 
‘Italian’ has long been a major factor that pushed Italian firms to invest abroad. Among the first 
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movers were the two largest Italian mixed banks, Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI) and Credito 
Italiano (CI) in the early twentieth century.  
In 1906 BCI took over Banco Commerciale Italiano of São Paulo, which was renamed Banco 
Commerciale Italo-Brasiliano. This bank had been founded in 1900 by a group of Italian 
entrepreneurs and could then be used by BCI to collect deposits among the Italian community in 
São Paulo and secure the banking work connected with the sending of remittances to Italy. In 1910 
BCI, together with its French banking partner Paribas established the Banque Française et Italienne 
pour l’Amerique du Sud (Sudameris), into which Banco Commerciale Italo-Brasiliano was 
integrated. The reasons for this venture are to be found in the failure of French banking expansion 
in Brazil. Indeed, the scarcity of French immigrants in Brazil made it difficult for a large French 
bank to survive in Latin America, the more so as potential customers tended to turn to banks from 
their own country. Therefore, BCI and Paribas saw in the creation of a joint-venture (Sudameris) a 
way to combine the advantages of French capital and financial expertise with the presence of 
sizeable Italian communities in Brazil. Sudameris soon developed its own banking network in 
South America: after São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, in 1912 a third branch was opened in Buenos 
Aires. In the 1920s Sudameris set up its own branches also in Uruguay, Chile and Colombia. All 
these branches were active in collecting deposits from Italian communities and in financing 
companies run by Italian immigrants, the most prominent of whom at the same time sat in the 
bank’s discount commissions.
43  
The same factors acted to prompt BCI’s expansion in the US. The presence of a large number of 
Italian immigrants who sent remittances to their families in Italy pushed BCI to open a branch in 
New York in 1918. The choice of a branch was taken in spite of many restrictive regulations 
concerning the activity of foreign banks in the state of New York, the most important of which was 
the prohibition of the deposit taking function. As migration flows to the US were curtailed in the 
early 1920s, BCI decided to undertake direct deposit collection within the country and in 1924 
established a wholly owned trust company – Banca Commerciale Italiana Trust Company of New 
York (BCI Trust) – for this purpose. As this was a legally-constituted US undertaking, it could take 
deposits in New York unfettered. In the late 1920s, BCI planned to establish further trust companies 
in those US cities where there was a sizeable Italian community, such as Boston, Chicago, 
Cleveland, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and St. Louis. In 1929 the trust companies in Boston and 
Philadelphia began business while the openings of the others were abandoned after the October 
1929 crash.
44 
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Collecting deposits among Italian immigrants and managing remittances to Italy was also one of the 
main determinants of CI’s FDI in South America, when in 1911 it joined a group a Belgian, Swiss 
and French banks in setting-up Banque Italo-Belge (BIB).
45  
The possibility of relying on a demand for ethnic products was particularly important for FDI 
carried out by food companies. A paramount case was that of Buitoni, whose venture in the US 
started in 1939 when it opened a Buitoni pavilion at the World Fair in New York. By the end of 
1941, Buitoni created two American companies: La Bomboniera, to manage the Perugina 
subsidiary’s flagship store and a warehouse in New York City, and Buitoni Products Inc., to 
manage two pasta restaurants inside the Fair’s Amusement Area in New York. Buitoni Products 
restaurants initially used pasta produced by an Italian-American supplier, but in 1943 acquired a 
small plant for pasta production in Jersey City. In 1952, Buitoni inaugurated a new huge plant in 
Hackensack, NJ. However, the crisis that hit the company in the 1970s forced it to liquidate its 
production facilities in the US and retain only a commercial organisation.
46  
Ethnic demand by Italian emigrants also drove the expansion in South America of Italy’s largest car 
manufacturer, Fiat. In the years between the two world wars Fiat attempted to enter that market by 
setting up sales subsidiaries in Argentina and Brazil, but this effort was unsuccessful in the face of 
the competition by such US giants as GM and Ford that had established production facilities in 
those countries.
47   
After WWII Fiat decided to undertake direct production in South America. In 1952, Fiat came to a 
technical backup agreement with the tractor division of the Argentine state-owned company IAME 
(State Aeronautical and Mechanical Industries) that led, in 1954, to the setting-up of Fiat Someca 
Construcciones (renamed in 1965 Fiat Concord) in Còrdoba for the production of agricultural 
tractors. In 1955 a plant for diesel engines production was added in the same location. Finally,  in 
1959, the Argentine government approved Fiat’s proposal to build a new plant in Caseros (Buenos 
Aires), the first one for car manufacturing. The establishment of production facilities in Argentina 
enabled Fiat to become the market leader in that country by relying to a large extent on an ethnic 
clientele that perceived Fiat cars as ‘Italian’.
48  
In 1973 Fiat got also into the Brazilian market by establishing Fiat Automovéis in Belo Horizonte, a 
joint venture with the state of Minas Gerais, for the production of agricultural tractors. Within a few 
years car production was added. In 1986 Fiat took over the whole ownership of the company and 
Fiat Automovéis soon became the most important foreign subsidiary of the group. In the mid-1990s 
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Fiat had become one of the top-three companies on the Brazilian market challenging the dominant 
position of the US big car manufacturers.
49 
South American countries with a sizeable Italian community remained very important to Fiat’s 
strategy also in the 1990s, when the company launched the project for its world car. As in the 




4.2. Financing FDI  
Until 1990 the Italian government imposed severe constraints to capital exports. This made 
emigrant communities a valuable resource to Italian companies also as potential financers of their 
investments abroad. 
Once again, among first movers were the mixed banks. After the bank had been taken over by BCI, 
Italian immigrants in São Paulo retained a share of the capital of Banco Commerciale Italiano and a 
few year later subscribed a share of the capital of Sudameris. The same occurred with BIB 
established by CI. Similarly, when striving to obtain the resources necessary for its expansion in the 
US, BCI created in 1928 a holding company – BCI Corporation – which was also to manage the 
trust companies. BCI incorporated BCI Corporation and raised US$ 1,900,000 through an offer 
equal to ¼ of its stock, mainly underwritten by Italian immigrants in the US.
51 
Also manufacturing firms relied on emigrant communities to finance their investment abroad. One 
exemplary case is that of Pirelli, which in 1910 established a sales subsidiary and then in 1917 a 
factory for electric conductors manufacturing in Argentina, with BIB participating in its capital. 
Pirelli’s penetration in the Argentine market was hindered by the major British and German 
electromechanical groups, which controlled the local electricity distribution sector and had secured 
captive contracts for their cables and equipment. To counteract its competitors, Pirelli decided in 
1911 to take part in the setting-up of an Argentine electricity company, Compañía Italo-Argentina 
de Electricidad, in which the Italian business community in Argentina was largely involved. In fact, 
one fifth of the capital of Compañía Italo-Argentina de Electricidad was subscribed by a group of 
Italian businessmen living in Argentina while a number of other Italian and Swiss companies were 
also involved in this venture.
52  
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Buitoni investments in the US relied to an even larger extent on funding from Italian emigrants. 




4.3. Ethnic labour force and managerial staff  
Emigrant communities provided foreign subsidiaries of Italian companies also with ethnic labour 
force and managerial staff. This was the case for both banks and manufacturing firms. 
Italian managers and clerks were persistently requested in South America by both Sudameris and 
BIB. Italian personnel was preferred because it was able to operate in credit markets ethnically 
characterized – where it was necessary to speak the clientele’s language – such as São Paulo and 
Buenos Aires.
54  
In the 1920s and 1930s all managers, technicians and foremen as well as most of white and blue 
collar workers of Pirelli Argentina were former Italian immigrants. Usually a blue collar worker 
was hired after having been introduced to the company by another worker or foreman (often a 
relative or a countryman), by an executive or middle manager, or by one of the many Italian 
Catholic organisations that operated in Argentina at that time.
55 
In the 1940s all managers and most of the labour force of La Bomboniera and Buitoni Products Inc. 
in the US were also Italian immigrants or Italian-Americans. When, in 1952, Buitoni launched its 
macaroni dinners in supermarkets, Joe di Maggio, the retired baseball star and himself an Italian-
American, was hired as testimonial and appointed vice president of the company in charge of public 
relations with the West Coast.
56 
Also Fiat’s subsidiaries in Argentina and Brazil have relied heavily on the local Italian community 
for the provision of their labour force and management.
57  
 
4.4. Information channelling  
Lastly, Italian emigrants were a source of valuable information on business opportunities in their 
country if settlement that turned out be very important to Italian firms aiming at investing abroad. 
BCI’s expansion in South America relied to a great extent on the information provided by a group 
of Italian entrepreneurs in São Paulo headed by Francisco Matarazzo, whose business interests 
ranged from textiles, to metal engineering and to finance.
58 When, after WWI, BCI started to regard 
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the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian empire as its main area of expansion after the 
Americas, it relied to a great extent on the information and ties provided by Camillo Castiglioni, an 
ethnic-Italian Trieste-born financier who before 1914 had moved to Vienna where he had become a 
leading figure in the local business community.
59 
Similarly, Pirelli’s involvement in Compañía Italo-Argentina de Electricidad was largely due to its 
tie with an Italian engineer, Giovanni Carosio, who in the late nineteenth century had migrated to 
Argentina where he had founded two electricity companies. The wave of mergers and acquisitions 
that occurred in the Argentine electricity industry in the first decade of the twentieth century pushed 
Carosio to quit these companies and rally a group of investors within the local Italian business 
community who asked Pirelli to join them in the setting-up of Compañía Italo-Argentina de 
Electricidad.
60 
Fiat’s expansion in Argentina after WWII hinged initially on the referral services provided by 
Agostino Rocca, an Italian top-manager who had migrated to Argentina in 1946. Rocca’s ties with 
the Argentine authorities helped Fiat to sign the first agreements with the Argentine state-owned 
company IAME.
61   
The role of business information channelled by emigrants seems to have been important in 
particular for FDI carried out by small and medium sized firms. In this respect, an exemplary case is 
that of Massimo Coen, an Italian Jew who left Italy to London to escape from the anti-semitic laws 
passed by the fascist regime in 1938. During WWII he worked at the BBC international service to 
Italy and at the same time attended a course for foreign students at LSE. After the war he quit the 
BBC and set up Granosa Trading Co. Ltd., a company which took the agency for about thirty wool 
mills of the Prato textile district, that could therefore exploit the demand for Italian textile products 
of the Italians living in the UK. Coen’s ties with the Tuscan business community brought him to 
also establish Etrufin Reserco, a company which represented eight Tuscan saving banks in the UK. 
In the 1970s he founded the consulting firm Britalia Consultants and became the honorary chairman 
of the Italian Chamber of Commerce in the UK.
62  
Another interesting case is that of Italy’s major semiconductor manufacturer, Società Italiana 
Semiconductors (SGS). By the end of the 1970s, SGS was losing money. The recovery started in 
1980 when president and CEO of the company was appointed Pasquale Pistorio, a Sicilian engineer 
who in the 1970s had migrated to the US to serve as international marketing director and vice 
president of Motorola. Relying on the knowledge of the ICT sector he had developed in the US, 
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Pistorio led SGS to merge with France’s Thomson-CSF, creating SGS Thomson. In the 1990s, the 
company, which until then had remained focused on the European market, expanded its operations 
in the US with the acquisition of TAG Semiconductors, Metaflow Technologies, and Arithmos.
63 
 
5. Entrepreneurial Histories: Inward FDI 
 
The strong ties between the Italian diaspora and their homeland also boosted inward FDI. In this 
case the mechanism at work was constituted by the valuable information on business opportunities 
in Italy that companies set up by emigrants utilized to invest in Italy from abroad. This has enabled 
them to enter the Italian economy without having to overcome the formal and informal barriers that 
may have halted other investors. As in this case we are dealing with mainly one factor (information 
channelling), this section is structured by sequentially presenting three exemplary entrepreneurial 
histories for which information channelled by emigrants’ networks turned out to boost Italy’s 
inward FDI: Techint, Charles Forte (Carmine Monforte) and Lee Iacocca. 
 
5.1. Techint  
Techint was founded after WWII by the Italian engineer Agostino Rocca. Born in 1895, Rocca 
graduated at Milan Polythechnic in 1921 and in the same year started to work as a trainee engineer 
at Dalmine, Italy’s main producer of seamless steel tubes. In 1933 Dalmine was taken over by the 
state-owned holding IRI, that two years after appointed Rocca as the company’s managing director. 
In 1937, when IRI’s steel companies were grouped in the sub-holding Finsider, Rocca also became 
the latter’s general manager.
64  
After WWII, having no chances to return to a top position within Finsider and Dalmine because of 
his collaboration with the fascist regime, Rocca set up his own company – Compagnia Tecnica 
Internazionale – and in 1946 migrated to Argentina. Compagnia Tecnica Internazionale’s 
headquarters was also transferred to Argentina and in 1947 the company was renamed Techint. The 
company began providing engineering services in Argentina and other Latin America countries. 
Construction activities soon followed, among them the southern gas pipeline in Argentina, 
inaugurated in 1949: seamless steel tubes for this venture were imported from Rocca’s former 
company Dalmine. In the 1950s Techint established two subsidiaries for seamless steel tubes 
production: Tamsa in Veracruz (Mexico) and Siderca in Campana (Argentina), with Dalmine 
assuming a minority shareholding. Several managers, technicians and workers for Siderca’s were 
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also provided by Dalmine and by another Italian company, Innocenti, that had collaborated to the 
construction of the Dalmine plant in Apuania (Tuscany) in the late 1930s.
65 
After Agostino Rocca died in 1978, his son Roberto became Techint’s president. When Italy 
privatized the state-owned holding IRI, Techint, through its subsidiary Siderca, obtained in 1996 a 
controlling interest in Dalmine, the company where its founder, Agostino Rocca, had worked for 
more then twenty years and served as managing director before WWII.
66  
In Italy, the Techint group also entered the health services sector in the mid-1990s by building and 
managing Istituto Clinico Humanitas, a state-of-the-art hospital and medical research institute near 
Milan. Specialized company Humanitas has subsequently acquired controlling interests in other 
important private hospitals in Bergamo, Turin and Catania.
67  
 
5.2. Charles Forte (Carmine Monforte)  
Carmine Monforte was born in Monforte Casalattico, a small village near Rome, in 1908. He 
emigrated from Italy to Scotland at the age of four. He worked in a cafe chain owned by his father 
and in 1935 set up his first milk bar as Strand Milk Bar Ltd. Soon he began expanding into catering 
and hotel businesses. After WWII, his company (renamed Forte Holdings Ltd) expanded to the 
catering and hotel sectors. By the end of the 1960s Forte Holdings managed the catering service for 
125 airlines and 19 international airports and numbered 940 hotels throughout the world.  
The Forte group also invested in Italy with its major investment being the construction of a big 
hotel complex in Sardinia. In the 1970s Charles Forte served as president of the Italian Chamber of 




5.3. Lee Iacocca  
Lido Anthony ‘Lee’ Iacocca was born in 1924 in Allentown, Pennsylvania, the son of Italian 
immigrants. Iacocca’s father ran one of the first car rental agencies in the US and passed on his love 
of the automobile to his son. After graduating in engineering, Iacocca began a career at Ford Motor 
Company. In 1960 he became vice president of Ford’s car and truck group; in 1967, executive vice 
president; and in 1970, president.
69  
Once in a top executive position, Iacocca acted to boost Ford business with Italy. He approached 
Alejandro De Tomaso, an Italian-Argentine industrialist who had set up a sports car company in 
                                                 
65 Lussana, ‘Argentina: Agostino Rocca’. 
66 Dringoli, ‘Le privatizzazioni’. 
67 Pederson, The International Directory. 
68 Bigazzi, ‘Piccoli e grandi imprenditori’. 
69 Iacocca, Iacocca.   26
Modena, asking him to create a high performance European car for Ford showrooms. This car, 
named Pantera – equipped with a Ford V-8 engine – started to be sold in the US in 1971 by Ford’s 
Lincoln-Mercury division. In 1972 Ford acquired Ghia and Vignale, the two workshops in Italy 
where Panteras were manufactured. As many as 6,000 Panteras were sold in the US before Ford 
ended the arrangement in 1974 because safety and emissions laws would have required a major 
redisegn of the car.
70     
Iacocca was sacked by Ford in June 1978, but five months after he was named president of Chrysler 
and began transforming that automaker from a sluggish moneymaker into a highly profitable 
business. 
As president of Chrysler, Iacocca once again collaborated with De Tomaso, who in the meantime 
had acquired Maserati in Italy. In 1984 Iacocca asked Maserati to build a convertible coupe, named 
Chrysler-Maserati TC. Chrysler also acquired 3.5% of the capital of Maserati, that was increased to 
15.6% in 1985. However, the Chrysler-Maserati TC sold poorly: between 1987 and 1990, only 
7,500 cars were manufactured for the American market. Thus, Chrysler eventually receded from 
that venture and sold its Maserati shares to Fiat.
71   
In 1987 Chrysler also took over Lamborghini, another Italian sports car manufacturer. At the end of 
1992, Iacocca retired, but remained a consultant to Chrysler until 1994. In the same year, Chrysler 
sold Lamborghini to an Indonesian investment group headed by Tommy Suharto.
72  
After retirement, Iacocca still cultivated his ties with Italy and bought a large farm in Tuscany, 





This paper shows that Italy stays at the centre of a double set transnational networks, one of 
emigrants and the other of immigrants. However, contrary to the theoretical predictions provided by 
matching models, only the former has significantly boosted the country’s bilateral FDI. 
We interpret this result by taking into account some key factors that, in an historical perspective, 
have shaped the nature of migrant ties with their home countries, and by analysing some exemplary 
cases of outward and inward Italian FDI. As to emigrants, we show that over time they constructed 
a ‘strong-ties’ relationship with their home country. This was the cumulative result of a number of 
circumstances: i) the circular nature of the Italian emigration, with many emigrants returning home 
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regularly, maintaining enduring ties with their families and towns of origin; ii) the tendency of 
Italians living abroad to gather in ethnic communities, little Italys or rural villages that preserved 
their original culture, language and traditions; iii) the action of the Italian government, that 
demonstrated on interest on emigration matters, especially regarding social, institutional and 
political aspects. An important consequence of this is the Italian law of citizenship, which was 
conceived with the purpose of preserving the Italian nationality of the diaspora.  
However, the Italian government, however, has long failed to recognize the importance of emigrant 
ties in prompting bilateral FDI. The absence of active government policies on this regard turned out 
to strengthen the propensity role of Italy to invest in (and attract FDI from) countries where the 
support of emigrants was available.  
We documents emigrants’ ties have provided Italian firms wanting to invest abroad with valuable 
information, a reliable ethnic labour force and managerial staff, the demand for the final products 
and often also the funding of their investments projects. These factors have been largely present 
across the entrepreneurial histories that we have presented in this paper.  
The strong ties between the Italian diaspora and their homeland have also boosted inward FDI. In 
this case the mechanism at work was constituted mainly by the valuable information on business 
opportunities in Italy that companies managed by emigrants utilized to invest in Italy from abroad. 
Moreover, the Italian citizenship has given them an additional advantage with respect to other 
potential foreign investors.  
As to immigrants, our evidence differs from theoretical predictions and from results of empirical 
studies on other receiving countries: immigrants in Italy have not prompted bilateral FDI. Some 
possible explanations for this result have been examined. Among these are: i) the shortest history of 
the immigration phenomenon in Italy relatively to that of other major receiving countries; ii) the 
gender imbalance of some immigrant communities; iii) the low-skill, low-wage level of most 
immigrants’ jobs; iv) the scant and diminishing presence of immigrant associations in Italy.  
Lastly, we suggest that Italy’s strong ties with its diaspora may have in fact crowed-out the weaker, 
but potentially profitable, ties with immigrant networks and, through them, with their countries of 
origin. This could be a major problem as some of these networks are generated by immigrants from 
emerging fast-growing countries. 




Table A1. Data and Sources 
 
Data Source 
Distance  The great circle distance in km between capital cities, which is available on   
http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm .  
Italian emigrants: stocks (1990-2004 
average) 
AIRE (Anagrafe Italiani Residenti all’Estero); register of Italians residing abroad. Ministry of 
Interior: http://infoaire.interno.it/. 
Immigrants:  stocks (1990-2004 average)  ISTAT: Migration trends and foreign population.  Census data on resident population.  
Foreign direct investment inward and 
outward (stocks): current prices, U.S 
million dollars (1990-2004 average) 
Source OECD International Direct Investment Statistics - International direct investment by 
country Vol. 2005 release 01 and  
UNCTAD WID Country Profiles and National Statistics  
 
Italian Schools: total number of Dante 
Alighieri and other Italian Schools (1990-
2004 average).  
-  Dante Alighieri schools - http://www.scuoladantealighieri.org/  
-  Italian schools abroad: Italian Foreign Ministry, www.esteri.it 
 
Religion: % of Christians (Roman 
Catholics, Greek Catholics, Protestants, 
Anglicans,  Lutherans, Orthodox and 
other Christians) on population (1990-
2004 average) 
The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency. 
Governance indexes (1990-2004 
average) 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A.  and Zoido-Lobatòn, P., ‘Governance Matters’, Policy Research 
Working Paper 2196, The World Bank (1999).  
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Table A2. Abnormal inward FDI (%)* 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 Albania      -2.15208 
 Algeria      -1.59962 
Argentin       0.71607 
Australi      -0.55099 
 Austria      -1.74061 
  Brazil      -0.48297 
Bulgaria      -1.71389 
  Canada      -2.32711 
   Chile       0.81348 
China -1.86326 
 Croatia      -2.39157 
Czech Re      -2.06033 
 Denmark      -1.71001 
   Egypt      -0.89842 
  France       7.50504 
Germany        3.30933 
  Greece      -3.02291 
 Hungary      -2.19712 
   India       0.33768 
Indonesi       0.76138 
    Iran      -0.02146 
 Ireland      -2.63748 
  Israel      -0.80279 
   Japan       2.38237 
Korea 0.36299 
   Libya      -1.91525 
 
Luxembou       9.40127 
Malaysia      -0.48457 
  Mexico       1.12805 
 Morocco      -4.84240 
Netherla      10.17629 
  Norway      -0.66528 
Philippi       0.80215 
  Poland      -1.79712 
Portugal      -0.57503 
 Romania      -1.98488 
Russian       -2.26108 
Singapor       1.31414 
Slovak R      -1.87706 
Slovenia      -2.88379 
South Af      -2.28452 
   Spain      -3.67001 
  Sweden       0.34775 
Switzerl      13.66831 
Thailand       0.57948 
 Tunisia      -2.37724 
  Turkey      -1.25607 
 Ukraine       0.94828 
United K       3.98198 
United S      -2.29497 




Notes: In bold the positive ‘abnormal’ inward FDI. The percentage is calculated as i ξ × 100. 
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Table A3 Abnormal outward FDI (%) * 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Albania         -3.02839 
Algeria         -2.54835 
Argentin          0.62485 
Australi         -0.07590 
Austria         -2.02972 
Brazil          1.55987 
Bulgaria         -2.58716 
Canada         -0.57643 
Chile         -0.75987 
China       -0.84407 
Croatia         -2.80816 
Czech Re         -2.60358 
Denmark         -2.23276 
Egypt         -1.99525 
France          8.10217 
Germany           3.70484 
Greece         -2.28847 
Hungary         -2.57059 
India         -1.16124 
Indonesi         -0.80914 
Iran         -1.33501 
Ireland         -0.14906 
Israel         -2.01551 
Japan          0.09229 
Korea      -0.97139 
Libya         -1.79926 
 
Luxembou         12.28763 
Malaysia         -0.88956 
Mexico         -0.76132 
Morocco         -1.98070 
Netherla         15.47556 
Norway         -2.10775 
Philippi         -0.89460 
Poland         -1.52437 
Portugal         -1.39905 
Romania         -2.44313 
Russian          -1.90342 
Singapor         -0.75857 
Slovak R         -2.72533 
Slovenia         -3.11542 
South Af         -0.88932 
Spain          2.53178 
Sweden         -1.83136 
Switzerl          4.91546 
Thailand         -1.00214 
Tunisia         -2.67041 
Turkey         -1.60150 
Ukraine         -1.03808 
United K          6.53649 
United S          9.78838 




Notes: In bold the positive ‘abnormal’ outward FDI. The percentage is calculated as i ε ~
× 100.  
*Residuals i ε ~
 from the cross-section regression: 
i
j , IT
i , IT ~
FDI
FDI
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Table A.4  Determinants of the FDI by other countries into the Italian economy (inward FDI) – cross-section 
regressions – IV (2SLS) estimation  

















+ + + + + + + + =
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑











, β β β β β β β α
74 
  (1) IV  (2) IV   (3) IV  (4) IV 
Constant 
 
0.09 (2.37)  0.084 (2.80)  0.095 (2.93)  0.076 (2.65) 
FDI (world) normalization 
 
0.534*** (3.68)  0.57** (2.80)  0.72***(4.87)  0.47** (2.62) 
Distance (logs) 
 
-0.011**(-2.55) -0.010**(-2.93) -0.011***(-3.12)  -0.009**(-2.71) 



















0.58 0.60 0.58 0.58 
N. Observations 
 
51 51 51  
Hausman test Null: OLS is consistent  2 χ (2) = 3.5 
Pvalue = 0.16 
2 χ (1) = 0.17 
Pvalue = 0.68 
2 χ (1) = 1.45 
Pvalue = 0.23 
2 χ (1) = 2.46 
Pvalue = 0.12 
First stage  F statistics < 10  weak 
instruments 
 F(2,45)=10.02  F(1,46)=8.54  F(1,46)=12.50 
Sargan over-identifying test  
Null: all instruments are valid  
 T  R
2.= 4.60 
Pvalue = 0.031 
  
 
Notes: : *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level. The t-value in parenthesis is based on the White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
The t-value in parenthesis is based on the White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.  
 
Instruments and endogenous variables 
Instruments for the “share of Italian emigrants”: predetermined stock of Italian emigrants, 1990 (logs), number of Italian 
schools abroad.  
Instruments for the ” share of foreign immigrants in Italy”: foreign immigrants toward core Europe (logs), predetermined 
stock of foreign immigrants in Italy, 1990 (logs), population density in the origin country (logs).  
 
(1) IV estimation: 2 instruments (stock of emigrants and immigrants 1990);  2 endogenous (share of emigrants and of 
immigrants, average 1991-2005). 
(2) IV estimation : 2 instruments (stock of emigrants 1990 and Italian schools abroad); 1 endogenous: (share of emigrants, 
average 1991-2005). 
(3) IV estimation 1 instruments ( Italian schools); 1 endogenous: (share of emigrants). 
(4) IV estimation 1 instruments (stock of immigrants 1990); 1 endogenous: (share of immigrants).  
                                                 
74 For this IV (2SLS) estimation we use the one-step specification of the inward FDI model presented in Note 19 which 
is equivalent to the two-step estimation procedure we used in Section II.    32
Table A.5 Determinants of the FDI from Italy into other countries (outward FDI) – cross-section 
regressions – IV (2SLS) estimation 













ς β β β β β β α + + + + + + + =
∑ ∑ ∑









  (1) IV   (2)IV  
Constant 
 
0.002  (0.94)  0.004  (1.48) 
European Union dummy : EU  
 
0.037** (2.17)  0.042**  (2.52) 
Stock of Italian emigrants, (logs): 
i IT EMI ,  
 
  
Stock of foreign immigrants (logs): 
IT i IMMI,  
 
  






EMI   0.477***  (3.38)  0.289**  (2.03) 






,   -0.019   (-0.38)  -0.008   (-0.21) 
R





 Null hypothesis:OLS is consistent 
2 χ (1) = 1.81,  Pvalue = 0.18 
2 χ (1) = 0.076, Pvalue = 0.78 
First stage F statistics < 10 weak instruments   F(2,46) = 11.32  F(1,47) = 6.36 
Sargan over-identifying test  
Null hypothesis: all instruments are valid 
T R
2.= 1.92,   Pvalue=0.16   
 
Notes: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level. The t-value in parenthesis is based on the White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors.  
 
Instruments and endogenous variables 
 
Instruments for the “share of Italian emigrants”: predetermined stock of Italian emigrants, 1990 (logs), number of Italian schools abroad. 
 
Instruments for the “Stock of  Italian emigrants abroad” , logs , the predetermined stock of foreign immigrants in Italy 1990 (logs), 
population density in the origin country, 1990 (logs). 
  
(1) IV estimation: 2 instruments (stock of emigrants 1990 and Italian schools abroad); 1 endogenous: (share of emigrants, average 1991-
2005) 
(2) IV estimation 1 instruments ( Italian schools); 1 endogenous: (share of emigrants)   33
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